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Regulation FD: An Alternative Approach to Addressing Information Asymmetry
Jill Fisch*
Abstract
This chapter traces the development of the SEC’s use of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) to
address information asymmetry in the securities markets. The chapter describes the SEC’s
developing enforcement policy and notes, in particular, the SEC’s efforts, through its selection
and settlement of Regulation FD cases, to provide guidance to corporations and corporate
officials about areas of key concern. The chapter concludes by highlighting current areas of
particular importance, including disclosure of information through private meetings and the
implications of technological innovations such as the internet and social media. The chapter is
forthcoming in Research Handbook on Insider Trading (Stephen Bainbridge, editor).
Although commentators have identified various reasons to regulate insider trading,1 one
rationale is to reduce the existence of information asymmetries in the securities markets. In its
litigations in Chiarella and Dirks, the government attempted to use fraud-based theories of
liability to address information asymmetries. The Supreme Court limited the effectiveness of
this approach by requiring a predicate breach of duty for a violation of Rule 10b-5.2
The SEC responded in August 2000, by adopting Regulation Fair Disclosure.3
Regulation FD took an alternative approach to information asymmetry that was not grounded in
theories of fraud but, instead, in issuer disclosure obligations.4 Specifically the Rule focused on
corporate issuers and corporate officials as the source of such asymmetries, reasoning that if

*
Perry Golkin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am grateful to Charlotte Newell,
Univ. of Pennsylvania Class of 2012, for excellent research support.
1
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading, in 5650 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 772
(Boudewijhn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds. 2000), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/5650book.pdf.
2
See id. at 773-774 (describing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Chiarella and Dirks as requiring an insider’s
breach of a fiduciary duty as a predicate to insider trading liability).
3
SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2000).
4
See Proposed Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, SEC Release Nos. 33-7787, 34-42259, IC-24209
(Dec. 20, 1999), 64 Fed. Reg. 72590-01 (Dec. 28, 1999) [hereinafter Proposing Release]; (“The approach we
propose does not treat selective disclosure as a type of fraudulent conduct or revisit the insider trading issues
addressed in Dirks.”).
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selective disclosures by corporate insiders could be prevented at the source, regulators would
have less need to address trading by the recipients of that information.5
Although critics initially raised concerns that Regulation FD would chill information
flow to the market, empirical studies suggest that changes in corporate policies did not
meaningfully reduce disclosure. At the same time, the effects of Regulation FD remain unclear.
After an initial series of enforcement actions, the SEC faced a stunning defeat in the Seibel
Systems case and virtually ceased to use Regulation FD for several years. Private meetings and
similar opportunities for selective disclosure continue to present the potential for information
asymmetries, however,6 and the SEC has responded with by showing renewed attention to
enforcement of Regulation FD. The SEC’s most recent approach reflects an effort to provide
ongoing guidance to issuers about its key concerns in this area.
I. The SEC’s adoption of Regulation FD
The SEC has traditionally expressed concern about insider trading and the effect of that
trading on the fairness and integrity of the securities markets.7 One focus of this concern has
been selective disclosure – the practice of issuers and corporate officials, in some cases, of
disclosing corporate information to select analysts, institutional investors or other market
participants, prior to disclosing that information to the general public. The ability of issuers to
control the manner and timing of information disclosures, in the view of the SEC, offered
corporate officials the opportunity to treat information as a commodity to curry favor with
particular market participants, create analyst conflicts of interest, or engage in self-dealing.
5

Id. at 72574 (“we propose to use our authority to require full and fair disclosure from issuers . . . . We believe this
approach would further the full and fair public disclosure of material information, and thereby promote fair dealing
in the securities of covered issuers.”)
6
See David Enrich & Dana Cimilluca, Banks Woo Funds With Private Peeks, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2011, available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703841904576256520217477678.html
7
See, e.g., Cady, Roberts & Co., Release No. 34-6668, 40 SEC 907 (1961) (opinion of Chairman Cary) (explaining
importance of insider trading liability in protecting the securities markets from abuses, “including specifically
improper transactions by officers, directors, and principal stockholders”).
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More generally, the SEC viewed selective disclosure, like other insider trading, as a threat to
market integrity and investor confidence.8
As the SEC explained in its proposing release, it had previously addressed selective
disclosure through the general antifraud provision – SEC Rule 10b-5.9 The SEC’s ability to treat
selective disclosure as securities fraud was compromised, however, by the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Chiarella10 and Dirks. 11 In particular, these decisions imposed a requirement, for
insider trading to be fraudulent, that the trader receive the information as the result of a breach of
duty.12 This legal standard created particular difficulties of application in connection with
research analysts. The SEC found that public companies were "disclosing important nonpublic
information, such as advance warnings of earnings results, to securities analysts or selected
institutional investors or both, before making full disclosure of the same information to the
general public.”13 Nonetheless, the evidence in most cases of selective disclosure did not seem
to support the “personal benefit” required under Dirks.14
Consequently, in October 2000, the SEC adopted Regulation FD.15 Regulation FD was
promulgated as an “issuer disclosure rule.”16 Rather than being addressed to insider trading or
fraudulent conduct, Regulation FD was, in the SEC’s words, “similar to existing Commission
rules under Exchange Act Sections 13(a) and 15(d).”17 Nonetheless, the SEC explicitly

8

See Panel Discussion: The SEC’s Regulation FD, 6 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 273, 278 (2001) (remarks of
Professor Harvey J.L. Goldschmid) (explaining that the same policy rationale applied to regulating selective
disclosure as for insider trading).
9
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). See Proposing Release, supra note 4; Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, SEC Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716 (Aug. 24, 2000) [hereinafter
Adopting Release].
10
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
11
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
12
Cite to elsewhere in book where Chiarella and Dirks are discussed.
13
Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51716.
14
See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. at 662 (requiring a personal benefit to the tipper for tipper/tippee liability).
15
See Regulation Fair Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2000); Adopting Release, supra note 7.
16
Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51716.
17
Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 72594.
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explained that the Rule targeted conduct that had been the subject of insider trading enforcement
actions prior to Dirks and Chiarella.18
The structure of Regulation FD is straightforward. Regulation FD addresses the
disclosure of information rather than its subsequent use, and is expressly directed to the sources
of the information: issuers and corporate officials.19 The Rule applies only to disclosures to four
categories of recipients: “(1) brokers and dealers; (2) investment advisors and certain
institutional investment managers; (3) investment companies and hedge funds; and (4) holders of
the issuer's securities in circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that the holder will
purchase or sell the issuer's securities on the basis of the information.”20 Thus the Rule focuses
on investor and capital market disclosures rather than ordinary business communications with a
firm’s customers, suppliers and the like. The rule also exempts communications to recipients
who owe a duty of confidentiality to the issuer, including lawyers, accountants and, at the time of
its adoption, credit-rating agencies.21 In conjunction with the passage of Dodd-Frank, the
exemption for communications to credit rating agencies was eliminated.22
Rather than explicitly prohibiting selective disclosure, Regulation FD takes the form of a
disclosure mandate, requiring public disclosure of all material information that is disclosed by
the issuer or its agents to someone within the enumerated categories of recipients. If the issuer
intentionally discloses material non-public information to such a recipient, it is required to
disclose that information, simultaneously, to the public. If the initial disclosure of the
18

Id. at 72593. Similarly, the rule was adopted in conjunction with two other rules designed to clarify the
application of Rule 10b-5 to certain types of insider trading. Id. at 72591.
19
The rule applies to disclosures by issuers and their agents. The term “person acting on behalf of an issuer” is
defined to include senior management, investor relations personnel and people who communicate regularly with
market participants, but not all corporate employees. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c) (2011).
20
SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)-(b)(1) (2011).
21
17 C.F.R. § 243.101(b)(2)(i) (2011).
22
Dodd-Frank § 939B removes the CRA exemption from Regulation FD. The SEC has implemented section 939B
through formal rule-making. See Removal from Regulation FD of the Exemption for Credit Rating Agencies,
Securities Act Release No. 33-9146, 75 Fed. Reg. 61050, 61050 (Oct. 4, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 243).
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information is inadvertent, the issuer must publicly disclose the information “promptly,” which
the rule defines to mean “as soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event after the later of 24
hours or the commencement of the next day's trading on the New York Stock Exchange).” The
rule allows the issuer to make public disclose by filing a Form 8-K or through another means of
disclosure that is “that is reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of
the information to the public.”
Regulation FD incorporates the materiality standard of federal securities fraud.
Nonetheless, the Rule does not involve a fraud-based conception of liability. In addition,
Regulation FD specifically provides that its violation does not constitute a violation of SEC Rule
10b-5.23
Many comments submitted in response to the proposed Rule reflected a concern about
identifying when “material” information had been disclosed and would require corrective public
disclosure. In response, the adopting release included seven categories of information that the
Commission indicated were likely to be considered material.24 These categories included (1)
earnings information, (2) mergers and acquisitions, (3) new products or discoveries, (4) change
in control or management, (5) change in auditors, (6) events regarding the issuer's securities,
such as a default or stock split, and (7) bankruptcies or receiverships.25
The SEC also announced, in the adopting release, its intention to retain the so-called
mosaic theory in its analysis of materiality under Regulation FD.26 The mosaic theory posits that
information does not become material merely because it can “assume heightened significance
23

17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2011).
See Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51721.
25
Id.
26
The mosaic theory is not a creation of the SEC, but a judicially imposed limitation on the scope of materiality for
purposes of insider trading analysis. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 14 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that
“corporate management may reveal to securities analysts or other inquirers non-public information that merely fills
‘interstices in analysis,’ or tests ‘the meaning of public information.’”).
24
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when woven by the skilled analyst into the matrix of knowledge obtained elsewhere.”27 As the
SEC explained, “an issuer is not prohibited from disclosing a non-material piece of information
to an analyst, even if, unbeknownst to the issuer, that piece helps the analyst complete a "mosaic"
of information that, taken together, is material.”28
II. Initial experience under Regulation FD
Early reactions to the rule were highly critical. In particular, the business community
expressed concern that Regulation FD would chill disclosure.29 Commentators warned that
issuer fears about potential liability would reduce or eliminate their informal communications
with the market.30
In the months after the SEC adopted Regulation FD, however, predictions of widespread
market disruptions were not borne out.31 Although issuers reported changing their disclosure
policies and practices in response to the Rule, the market did not experience dramatic reductions
in the dissemination of information32 or substantial increases in price volatility.33 Instead, issuers

27

Id. at 9; see also Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165-66 (2d Cir. 1980) (warning that the
assessment of materiality in the context of the mosaic theory must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis).
28
See Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51722. The SEC has only explicitly recognized the mosaic theory in the
context of Regulation FD, but defendants in recent insider trading cases have argued that their actions analogously
constituted the mere “piecing together” of “multiple tidbits of non-public information.” See Andrew Ross Sorkin,
Just Tidbits, or Material Facts for Insider Trading?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2010, available at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/just-tidbits-or-material-facts-for-insider-trading/
29
See, e.g., Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51718; Scott Russell, Regulation Fair Disclosure: The Death of the
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis and the Birth of Herd Behavior, 82 B.U.L. REV. 527, 545 (2002) (summarizing
concerns articulated by commentators about “inappropriate liability and the chilling effect on issuer disclosures”);
Michael Schroeder, Raytheon's Disclosure to Analysts Is Investigated, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2001, at A3 (quoting
SEC Commissioner Laura Unger reporting complaints about Regulation FD and concerns about the effect on
corporate communications); see also Peter Talosig III, Regulation FD - Fairly Disruptive? An Increase in Capital
Market Inefficiency, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 637 (2004).
30
See Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 51726 (“Several [commentators] suggested, however, that the language in
the Proposing Release offered insufficient protection from private lawsuits”); Peter Talosig III, Regulation FD Fairly Disruptive? An Increase in Capital Market Inefficiency, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 637 (2004).
31
See, Panel Discussion: The SEC’s Regulation FD, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 273, 291-92 (2001) (remarks of
Richard Anderson, Senior Vice President, Thomson Financial/Carson Global Consulting).
32
See, e.g., Jeff D. Opdyke, How Much Are Stocks Hurting From Recent Rash of Profit Preannouncements Tied to
New Rule, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at C1 ("First Call/Thompson Financial statistics show that through the end of
February, 551 companies have offered up earnings guidance for the current quarter. That is nearly five times the
volume of the year-earlier period.").
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adapted their disclosure practices in response to the adoption of Regulation FD. For the most
part, these adaptations resulted in increased public access to issuer information. Issuers began to
open their earnings conference calls to the general public and to broadcast their analyst meetings
on their websites.34 An early report indicated that, following adoption of the rule, issuer use of
webcasts quadrupled.35 Issuers began to develop best practices under Regulation FD that
included, in addition to granting the general public access to information sessions that had
previously been open only to invited participants, more frequent updating of their public
disclosures.36 These practices were enhanced by contemporaneous advances in technology that
permitted greater use of the internet and corporate websites by virtually all investors.
Researchers rapidly sought to evaluate the effects of Regulation FD, and early studies
reported conflicting results.37 One survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers, conducted a year after
Regulation FD was adopted, found that top executives were largely supportive of the rule.
Nearly 90% of the executives surveyed supported the rule, 75% reported that it had not impacted
their company’s stock price, and roughly half of respondents reported no increase in compliance
costs while those who reported an increase described it as “low to moderate.” 38

33

Id.
See Panel Discussion: The SEC’s Regulation FD, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 273, 292 (2001) (remarks of
Richard Anderson, Senior Vice President, Thomson Financial/Carson Global Consulting).
35
See SEC, Commissioner Laura S. Unger, Special Study: Regulation Fair Disclosure Revisited (2001) available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm [hereinafter Unger Special Study] (“between October 1, 2000 and
April 23, 2001, the number of corporate webcasts on its service nearly quadrupled from the same period twelve
months earlier (3,000 to 11,000).”
36
See, e.g., Stanley Keller, SEC Regulation FD -- The Selective Disclosure Rules, ALI-ABA Course of Study
Materials, Postgraduate Course in Federal Securities Law (July 2002) (describing evolving best practices for
corporate compliance with Regulation FD).
37
See Richard Walker, Director, Division of Enforcement, Remarks Before the Rocky Mountain Securities
Conference (May 18, 2001) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch492.htm (describing multiple studies
reporting effects of Regulation FD on information disclosure, issuer compliance costs and stock price volatility); see
also Unger Special Study, supra note __, (summarizing the findings of 8 surveys about Regulation FD conducted in
2001) .
38
See PricewaterhouseCoopers, Regulation FD Significantly Improves Disclosure, PricewaterhouseCoopers Survey
Finds (Oct. 17, 2001) available at
http://www.barometersurveys.com/vwAllNewsByDocID/EC0DF4912CF1BFFD45256B8E00013366/index.html
34

7

At the same time, market participants expressed concern that, in making their disclosures
more widely available, issuers were decreasing the quality of the information that they released.
An AIMR survey conducted in 2001 revealed that market professionals – analysts and portfolio
managers – reported receiving less information and lower quality information from issuers.39
The survey suggested that research analysts and other securities professionals were responding
by conducting more independent research rather than relying primarily on issuer disclosures. 40
The first formal empirical study of the impact of the rule was conducted by academics at
the business schools at University of Southern California and Purdue University.41 The study,
which examined more than 2000 firms immediately after the adoption of Regulation FD, found
“no evidence that Regulation FD impaired the quality and quantity of investors’ information.”42
The study found an increase in the informational efficiency of stock prices and “a marked
increase in firms’ voluntary disclosure frequency.”43
Finally, SEC Commissioner Unger released a study examining Regulation FD one year
after its effective date.44 The study summarized the testimony at an April 2001 SEC Roundtable
and identified various issues of concern, including a need for further guidance on materiality, the
incorporation of technological developments to facilitate public disclosure and the effect of the
rule on the quality of disclosure, particularly with respect to forward-looking information. The
study’s primary recommendation called for the SEC to continue to evaluate corporate disclosure
post-FD to determine if modifications to the Regulation were necessary.
III. Early enforcement actions
39

See The CPA Journal, Research studies show differing views on Regulation FD (Dec. 2001), available at
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2001/1200/nv/nv2.htm.
40
Id.
41
Frank Heflin, K. R. Subramanyam & Yuan Zhang, Regulation FD and the Financial Information Environment:
Early Evidence, 78 ACCT’G REV. 1 (2003).
42
Id. at 4.
43
Id.
44
See Unger Special Study, supra note __,.
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In conjunction with its adoption of Regulation FD, the SEC announced that it would
attempt to enforce the rule in a way that minimized its chilling effect on issuer communications
with the market.45 Nonetheless, the Commission rapidly brought a number of enforcement
actions.46 From 2002 to 2005, the SEC brought seven enforcement actions against issuers and
corporate officials and published one report of investigation.47 Most of these actions concerned
private communications about corporate earnings48 and all but one, Siebel Systems, were settled
and not contested.
The actions rapidly demonstrated the scope of the SEC’s commitment to the new rule and
its intention, through its selection of cases, to provide broader guidance to issuers and the market
about the scope of communications that it viewed as problematic. The SEC’s cases, in
particular, revealed the Commission’s intention not to limit its application of the rule to cases
involving literal factual inconsistencies between private communications and public
disclosures.49 Instead, the SEC’s actions targeted more subtle methods – winks and nods -- for
providing selected recipients with informational advantages. These methods included, for
example, a corporate official’s reaffirmation of earnings estimates that had previously been

45

See, e.g., Letter from then-SEC Chairman designee Harvey L. Pitt to the Chief Clerk, United States Senate,
Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, July 23, 2001 ("The Commission's Enforcement Staff has stated
that it will not attempt to second-guess reasonable, good faith judgments by persons who honestly attempt to comply
with Regulation FD. I agree with that approach."); Speech of then-Enforcement Director Richard H. Walker,
“Regulation FD: An Enforcement Perspective,” before the Compliance and Legal Division of the Securities Industry
Association, New York, Nov. 1, 2000 (stating that, at least in the early stages, the Enforcement Division will focus
its efforts on "egregious violations" and that the division is “not looking to frustrate the purpose of the rule – which
is to promote broader and fairer disclosure of information to investors – by second-guessing reasonable disclosure
decisions made in good faith, even if we don't agree with them..”).
46
See SEC Brings First Regulation FD Enforcement Actions, No. 2002-169, (Nov. 25, 2002) available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-169.htm (announcing the first four enforcement actions brought under
Regulation FD).
47
See Marc H. Folladori, Interlude for Regulation FD, Practicing Law Institute Course Handbook, October 2008.
48
The SEC had previously stated, in its adopting release, that a corporate official that provides earnings guidance
during private meetings with analysts “takes on a high degree of risk under Regulation FD.” Adopting Release,
supra note 7, at 51,721.
49
See William S. Lamb et al., SEC Continues to Define Regulation FD Parameters Through Enforcement Actions:
Reaffirmation of Guidance Can Constitute Violation, 24 No. 5 BANKING & FIN. SERV. POL'Y REP. 3, 4 (2005).
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publicly released (Flowserve)50, reviewing and correcting drafts of analyst reports (Senetek)51,
disclosure made through a combination of statements and a corporate official’s conduct, tone and
demeanor (Schering-Plough),52 and the use of code words in public statements that were
subsequently clarified through private conversations (Motorola)53. The SEC’s choice of
enforcement actions reflected its view that officials could violate Regulation FD not just by what
they said, but by how they said it.54
IV. Siebel Systems
The SEC faced a critical juncture in its enforcement of Regulation FD with the federal
court litigation in the Siebel Systems case. Siebel was actually a repeat offender. In November
2001, Siebel’s CEO made optimistic statements at a private technology conference that,
according to the SEC, differed materially from the statements made by the CEO on a public
conference call. Following the optimistic private statements, Siebel’s trading volume doubled
and its stock price increased by 16.5%. The SEC brought an enforcement action (Siebel I) that
Siebel settled by agreeing to a cease and desist order and paying a $250,000 penalty.
Only six months after the cease and desist order was entered, in April 2003, Siebel
engaged in conduct that the SEC viewed as similar to its prior Regulation FD violation.55 Siebel
communicated a negative outlook for the company in early April 2003 through a series of public
50

See Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, In the Matter of Flowserve Corp., Release No. 51427,
Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-11872, at 3 (Mar. 24, 2005).
51
See Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, In the Matter of Senetek P.L.C., Release No. 50400, Admin.
Proceeding File No. 3-11668, at 2 (Sept. 16, 2004).
52
See Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, In the Matter of Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act
Release No. 48,461, Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-11,249, at 3-7 (Sept. 9, 2003); SEC Files Settled Regulation FD
Charged Against Schering-Plough Corp. and its Former Chief Executive, Litigation Release No. 18,330, Case No.
1:03CV01880 (D.D.C.) (CKK) (Sept. 9, 2003); Jon Jordan, Corporate Issuers Beware: Scherling-Plough and
Recent SEC Enforcement Actions Signal Vigorous Enforcement of Regulation FD, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 751 (2004).
53
Motorola, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46,898, 2002 WL 31650174 (Nov. 25, 2002).
54
See Pepper Hamilton, Regulation FD Compliance after Schering-Plough – You’re your Mannerisms, (Nov. 10,
2003) available at http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications_article.aspx?ArticleKey=250 (“the SEC also chose this
set of facts to reinforce its views about the role non-verbal cues and signals can play in a Regulation FD violation”).
55
Complaint, at ¶ 4, SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d (No. 04 CV 5130) (2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18766.pdf.
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disclosures. Following those communications, on April 30, 2003, Siebel’s CFO and IR Director
met privately with several institutional investors. At the private meetings, which were organized
by Morgan Stanley, Siebel’s CFO, Kenneth Goldman, characterized Siebel’s business activity
levels as “good” and “better” and disclosed that new deals were coming into the company’s
pipeline. According to the SEC’s complaint, which carefully parsed these statements against the
company’s prior disclosures, these descriptions of Siebel’s business were inconsistent with and
affirmatively more positive than the prior public statements.56
Morgan Stanley subsequently communicated Goldman’s remarks from the meetings to its
other institutional clients. Morgan Stanley personnel characterized the tenor of the
communications as “the body language was positive.”57 The SEC’s Complaint documented that
the investors that attended the meetings and other institutional investors responded by purchasing
Siebel stock.58 The day after the meetings, Siebel’s stock price increased by 8%, and its trading
volume doubled.59
When the SEC brought a second enforcement action against Siebel and its officials, the
defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Although the defendants raised a variety of
arguments, the court did not reach most of them because it concluded that the defendants’ private
statements did not differ materially from information that had been publicly released.60 As a
result, the court held that the SEC’s complaint failed to state a claim.61

56

Id. at ¶ 49 (“These statements materially contrasted with the public statements that Thomas Siebel had made
during the April 4 and 23 conference calls and at the Deutsche Bank conference on April 28. For example, in
contrast to the apocalyptic economic environment that Thomas Siebel described at the Deutsche Bank conference,
Goldman’s disclosures at the April 30 Alliance meeting and Morgan Stanley dinner were significantly more positive
and upbeat.”); see also SEC’s opposition to Siebel’s motion to dismiss at 8 (stating that Siebel’s private statements
“materially contrasted with the Company's prior public statements ....”).
57
Id.at ¶ 52.
58
Id.at ¶ 53.
59
Id.at ¶ 54.
60
SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc., 384 F.Supp.2d 694, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
61
Id. at 710.
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In arguing that Goldman’s private statements were material, the SEC emphasized the
reaction by investors to those statements. As the SEC stated, “[t]he materiality of the
information is confirmed by the actions of those who attended the private meetings.”62 Thus
Siebel presented the issue of the extent to which stock price movements and investor trading
reactions to the information could be used to establish materiality as opposed to a comparison of
the precise wording used by corporate officials in different contexts. The issue was important
because of the potential for corporate officials to convey information indirectly -- through winks,
nods and body language. 63
With respect to this important aspect of Regulation FD, the court’s decision dealt the
SEC a substantial blow. Although the court stated that stock movement and investor reactions to
information could be considered relevant factors in determining the materiality of Siebel’s
statements, the court stated that they were not sufficient.64 Instead, the court engaged in a
precise comparison of Siebel’s public and private statements and concluded that the SEC had
been too demanding, requiring in essence that companies examine their statements with the
precision of a “lexicologist.”65 Because the court concluded that Siebel’s private statements
were “equivalent in substance to the information publicly disclosed [by the company],” it found
no violation.66
More problematic was the freedom created by the Siebel opinion for corporate officials to
engage in subjective characterizations that were not disclosed to the public even if investors
62

Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, at 2, SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d (2005)
(No. 04 CV 5130), 2004 WL 3142263.
63
See Adopting Release, supra note 7 at 51721 (noting that corporate officials can violate Regulation FD “whether
the information about earnings is communicated expressly or through indirect ‘guidance,’ the meaning of which is
apparent though implied.”).
64
See SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc., 384 F.Supp.2d 694, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that “although stock movement
is a relevant factor to be considered in making the determination as to materiality, it is not, however, a sufficient
factor alone to establish materiality.”)
65
Id. at 705.
66
Id.
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viewed those characterizations as altering the total mix of information available to the market.67
The court stated that “[t]he regulation does not prohibit persons speaking on behalf of an issuer,
from providing mere positive or negative characterizations, or their optimistic or pessimistic
subjective general impressions, based upon or drawn from the material information available to
the public.”68 This analysis seemed directly in tension with the Supreme Court’s guidance in
Virginia Bankshares, that expressions by corporate officials of their reasons, opinions or beliefs
were likely to be particularly important to investors in light of the “knowledge and expertness”
of those officials.69
V. After Siebel Systems
The SEC’s immediate response to Siebel Systems was to cease bringing enforcement
actions based on Regulation FD. Following the decision, the SEC did not bring another
Regulation FD enforcement action for more than four years.70 This reluctance can be seen as a
reaction not just to the loss, but to the nature of the Siebel court’s opinion which commentators
described a “public scolding.”71

67

As one commentator characterized the decision, “The fact that nonpublic subjective general impressions may
cause movement in stock price or trading volume does not, in and of itself, create a presumption that material
information was disclosed and Regulation FD was violated.” Robert F. Carangelo & Jaclyn G. Braunstein, Weil
Gotshal, Siebel Systems: A Speed Bump for the SEC on the Road to Regulation FD Enforcement?, at 11 (Dec. 2005)
available at http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=8086.
68
Siebel Systems, 384 F.Supp.2d at 707.
69
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Following this hiatus, the SEC resumed its efforts to use Regulation FD, but cautiously.72
Although the SEC has not formally retreated from its concern about implicit disclosures, it
resumed its enforcement efforts with a case involving private statements that were explicitly
inconsistent with the issuer’s public disclosures. In addition, the SEC issued several compliance
and disclosure interpretations to provide guidance concerning the SEC’s policies. The releases
focused, in particular, on the extent to which informal communications with analysts create
potential problems under Regulation FD.73
In 2009, the SEC filed its first Regulation FD enforcement action since the Siebel
Systems decision against Christopher Black, the former CFO of American Commercial Airlines
(ACL). According to the SEC’s litigation release, Black sent private e-mails to eight sell-side
analysts from his home, on a weekend, disclosing that earnings would be lower than the
guidance that had been disclosed by the company just days before. In contrast to the Siebel case,
Black’s comments were both written and clearly inconsistent with the company’s public
statements.
Notably as well, the SEC did not bring an enforcement action against ACL. According to
the SEC, ACL had maintained compliance systems reasonably designed to educate corporate
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employees and to prevent Regulation FD violations.74 In contrast to Siebel, ACL filed an 8-K on
the first trading day after it learned of Black’s disclosures. ACL also self-reported the violation
to the SEC and cooperated with the SEC’s investigation. In addition, ACL took remedial
measures to prevent future violations. The SEC’s decision can be understood as a message to
corporate issuers as to the value of adopting compliance procedures, cooperating with any SEC
investigation and remedying any potential selective disclosures promptly.
In March, 2010, the SEC brought an enforcement action against Presstek, Inc. and its
former CEO, Edward Marino.75 Marino, according to the SEC, selectively disclosed negative
financial information to a registered investment adviser two days before the end of the quarter
and one day before Presstek publicly announced that its earnings would be below prior estimates.
Like the Black case, Presstek involved what might be considered an egregious or a clearly
material selective disclosure – tipping investors or analysts right before the public disclosure of
an earnings surprise is precisely the type of disclosure to which Regulation FD was addressed.
Unlike the Black case, the SEC did sanction Presstek despite the existence at the company of FD
disclosure policies. Although the SEC’s rationale for proceeding against the issuer was not clear,
it may have been concerned about sending a message that the mere existence of a compliance
program would not insulate an issuer from liability.76
Office Depot was the third Regulation FD enforcement action within a period of slightly
more than a year.77 Office Depot reflected a somewhat more aggressive enforcement decision by
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the SEC. Faced with the concern that the company would not meet analysts’ earnings estimates,
Office Depot’s CEO and CFO coordinated a strategy for privately contacting 18 analysts in order
to lower the analysts’ expectations. The strategy included the preparation of talking points that
referenced comparable companies’ lower than expected performance and weakening economic
conditions.78 Six days later, the company publicly announced that earnings would be “negatively
impacted due to continued soft economic conditions.”
Notably, Office Depot involved issuer signaling rather than issuer statements that directly
contradicted public disclosures. The specific statements contained in Office Depot’s talking
points and communicated privately to the analysts were reminders about negative information
contained in the company’s prior public statements or references to other issuers whose earnings
were negatively affected by economic downturn. Accordingly, although the company engaged
in a deliberate campaign to persuade analysts to lower their earnings estimates through private
communications, it is unclear how a court would have analyzed the SEC’s claims under Siebel.79
The case is also notable in that the SEC brought its enforcement action against the CEO and
CFO although the selective disclosures were made by their subordinates.80
One of the SEC’s most recent enforcement actions involved an unusual fact pattern.81 In
First Third Bancorp, the defendant decided to redeem certain trust preferred securities on the
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basis that a provision of Dodd-Frank had created a “capital treatment event.” First Third
instructed the trustee to redeem the securities and to provide “all appropriate” notices of
redemption. In accordance with the governing trust documents, the trustee provided such a
notice to the Depository Trust Company, the only registered holder of record. DTC then posted
the notice of redemption on its website which was password protected and available only to
subscribers. When First Third became aware of unusual trading volume in the securities, it filed
an 8-K. The SEC’s settlement with First Third included only a cease and desist order and no
civil penalty, and noted the defendant’s cooperation and remedial actions once it become aware
of the significance of the selective disclosure. It is likely that the SEC’s decision to bring the
action was motivated, in part, by a desire to call attention to the potential for selective disclosures
even when information is disclosed over the internet or through a website. These concerns are
considered in more detail in the SEC’s release on internet disclosures discussed below.
As this book goes to press, the SEC’s most recent Regulation FD investigation appears to
involve Avon. In October 2011, Avon disclosed in its quarterly report that it had received an
SEC subpoena relating to an investigation of possible violations of Regulation FD.82 Media
reports state that the focus of the investigation is a private meeting between Avon’s CFO and a
Citigroup research analyst.83 The analyst’s report referred to information supplied by the CFO at
that meeting. The Avon investigation reflects the SEC’s ongoing suspicion over private
meetings between corporate officials and analysts or investors. Although the facts of the case
remain unclear, the information available should suggest to issuers that such meetings are likely
to trigger scrutiny. This message is reinforced by remarks made by SEC Official David
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Rosenfeld, at a conference in February.84 According to media reports, Rosenfeld expressed
concern as to whether issuers can participate in the common practice of private meetings and
calls consistent with their obligations under Regulation FD.
Despite regulatory concerns, private meetings continue to be a mainstay of Wall Street
practice.85 Brokerage firms compete for valued commission revenues through their ability to
arrange private meetings for their institutional investor clients.86 Banks and brokers deny that
such meetings are being used to convey material non-public information and claim that they
serve legitimate business purposes, and tout their ability to provide “access” as a means of
differentiating themselves from their competitors.87
VI. The effects of Regulation FD
When Regulation FD was first adopted, commentators widely agreed that it was difficult
to predict its long term effects. Scholars have drawn upon the prior ten years of experience with
the Rule to produce an extensive body of empirical research. The mixed results of this research
make it difficult, however, to draw definitive conclusions about the effects of the regulation.
There is substantial evidence that Regulation FD reduced selective disclosure and
information asymmetries.88 A study by Bei Dong and others, for example, focuses on leakage of
earnings information. The study concludes that, after the Rule’s adoption, information leakages
were reduced prior to earnings disclosures and that price volatility increased after the adoption,
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suggesting that the public disclosures revealed information not previously available to traders.89
Importantly, the study also suggests that the reduction of these asymmetries is beneficial to the
market. It finds that Regulation FD reduced bid-ask spreads, reflecting reduced concern by
market participants over the potential information advantages possessed by their trading
counterparties. Sinha and Gadarowsky report similar results, finding that information leakage
around voluntary management disclosures was reduced after Regulation FD.90 Another study
reports that the ability of analysts to exploit social ties to gain informational advantages virtually
disappeared in the post-FD era.91
Critics had predicted that Regulation FD would reduce information flow as issuers,
unwilling to disclose publicly, would reduce the overall amount of their disclosure. The studies
of this issue are mixed.92 At least some studies have found reduced overall disclosure, especially
by smaller firms.93 Scholars also report that Regulation FD delays the disclosure of information,
at least in some cases.94 On the other hand, studies have found increased reliance by analysts on
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public disclosures, and an increasing use by issuers of earnings guidance as a substitute for
selective disclosures.95
Some of the Regulation FD studies indicate that Regulation FD reduced information
quality.96 Lawrence, et al., for example, find that firms release less negative information
subsequent to the adoption of Regulation FD.97 Agrawal et al. find a reduction in analysts’
forecast accuracy.98 Another study finds that institutional investors are less able to identify mispriced public offerings post-Regulation FD.99
Perhaps most troublingly, there is evidence that information asymmetries persist after the
adoption of Regulation FD and that selective access to management continues to provide
investors with trading advantages.100 For example, one recent study finds that investor trade
sizes increase after investors obtain private meetings with corporate officials – and that those
sizes further increase if the official involved is the CEO.101 To the extent that, as the SEC argued
in Siebel, trading behavior is evidence that the investor has received material information, this
data raises the concern that such information continues to be communicated selectively.
Moreover, this research supports the SEC’s continued focus on private meetings as potential
sources for the communication of non-public information.
VII. Technological developments and Regulation FD
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Corporate disclosure practices have been adapted to reflect the selective disclosure
concerns reflected in Regulation FD. The world of information and disclosure continues to
evolve, however. Some of the most challenging changes that have occurred and are yet to come
concern the effect of technological developments on an issuer’s ability to make public
disclosures.
A. Issuer websites
The SEC adopted Regulation FD, in the middle of a technology revolution. In the years
following the Rule’s adoption, the SEC noted dramatic increases in investor access to the
internet.102 The SEC also noted that issuers were increasingly likely both to maintain a corporate
website and to include links on that website to their SEC filings and other investor-oriented
information. The internet offered the potential for issuers to provide broad-based dissemination
of information quickly and inexpensively, and some commentators criticized the SEC for failing
to incorporate internet-based disclosure into its requirements under Regulation FD.103
In 2008, the SEC responded. The Commission issued an interpretive release concerning
company web sites that included, in particular, guidance concerning the circumstances under
which a website posting could satisfy the public dissemination requirement under Regulation
FD.104 The very recognition that a website posting could be sufficient to comply with the rule
reflected a change from the position adopted by the SEC in 2000. The release went on to
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provide guidance concerning the evaluation of whether a website posting constituted the
necessary public disclosure required by the Rule. According to the SEC, the primary
considerations in determining whether posting information on a company website constituted
public disclosure for purposes of Regulation FD were 1) whether the company web site was “a
recognized channel of distribution;” 2) whether the website posting made the information
available to the general marketplace and 3) whether there was a reasonable waiting period for
investors and the market to react to the posted information.105
The SEC explicitly provided, in contrast to its earlier position, that “for some companies
in certain circumstances, posting of the information on the company’s web site, in and of itself, may
be a sufficient method of public disclosure under Rule 101(e) of Regulation FD.”106 The SEC noted

that the analysis was issuer-specific and would depend on an evaluation of the particular
circumstances. The SEC further noted that the manner and accessibility of information on an
issuer’s website were critical factors in evaluating whether a website posting constituted a public
disclosure. It is likely that the SEC’s decision to bring an enforcement action in the First Third
case was motivated, in part, by a desire to demonstrate to issuers the potential for selective
disclosure in cases in which access to a website posting is limited.
B. Social media
Social media presents still another challenge. Corporate executives increasingly discuss
their companies using social media tools such as Facebook and Twitter. These methods of
disclosure raise challenges over the traditional regulatory categories in that the communications
are not typically made to a favored few as in the case of private analyst meetings. Neither,
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however, are they open to the general public in the same way as a press release or Form 8-K
would be. Informal and unstructured social media communications also stretch the concept of
materiality.
One corporate executive has taken the use of social media communications to a new
level. WebMediaBrands CEO Alan Meckler has made a practice of communicating corporate
information to investors on a real time basis, using Twitter and his blog.107 In December 2010,
the SEC staff sent WebMediaBrands a comment letter questioning the company about Meckler’s
social media postings of company information.108 The company defended Meckler’s practices
on the grounds that the particular tweet and blogged information at issue did not involve
material, nonpublic information. The company also argued that Meckler’s tweets and blog posts
were equivalent to public distribution and, therefore, were Regulation FD compliant as a
"recognized channel" of public distribution, at least for this company and this CEO.109 To date,
Meckler has not stopped his use of social media, and the SEC has not brought an enforcement
action against him.110
Although, to date, SEC investigations involving social media postings appear to be
uncommon, and it is unclear how the SEC viewed WebMediaBrands’ argument that the postings
were public rather than selective disclosure. Nonetheless, issuers are beginning to consider such
postings in their Regulation FD compliance and education programs. IBM, for example,
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provides guidelines on social computing to its employees.111 Among these guidelines, IBM
warns its employees not to blog or twitter about confidential company information, including the
company’s future performance and business plans. It is likely to that attention to the
implications of Regulation FD for social media will rapidly become a component of best
practices for issuer compliance.
VIII. Conclusion
Despite the apparent setback of the Siebel Systems decision, the SEC’s efforts to address
selective disclosure through the promulgation and enforcement of Regulation FD should be
understood as successful. Issuers take seriously the applicable regulatory restrictions in
engaging in private communications with investors and analysts and have structured compliance
and education systems designed to reduce both intentional and unintentional selective
disclosures. Although the SEC has brought a limited number of cases enforcing the rule, its
selections appear designed less to punish wrongdoers than to announce generally applicable
standards of conduct and to expose areas of ongoing regulatory concern.
Several areas are likely to continue to raise SEC concerns. Private meetings are a
problematic area. The Commission appears likely to remain suspicious of the claim that private
meetings between corporate executives and analysts and investors do not involve selective
disclosures. The SEC’s concerns are supported by recent empirical studies suggesting that
private meetings confer trading benefits on their attendees. Nonetheless, the disclosure-based
structure of Regulation FD appears better suited to balancing competing policy considerations in
this area than the blunt force of antifraud liability. Similarly, the SEC will need to continue to
refine its enforcement of Regulation FD to incorporate technological developments, including
growing information transmission through the internet and social media. Responding to these
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developments requires a delicate balance in that technology offers the potential to level the
informational playing field at the same time that it presents new mechanisms for abuse.
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